Findings For 19 of 24 ARV dosage forms, we detected no association between price and volume purchased. For the other five ARVs, high-volume purchases were 4-21% less expensive than medium-or low-volume purchases. Nine of 13 generic ARVs were priced 6-36% lower when purchased under the Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI). Fifteen of 18 branded ARVs were priced 23-498% higher for differentially priced purchases compared with non-CHAI generic purchases. However, two branded, differentially priced ARVs were priced 63% and 73% lower, respectively, than generic non-CHAI equivalents.
Introduction
New goals on providing universal access to HIV/AIDS services by 2010 were announced in 2007 by WHO, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 1 The need for life-long HIV/AIDS treatment and the high cost of antiretroviral (ARV) agents present challenges to achieving and sustaining universal access targets. During the past decade, various large-scale strategies have been used to reduce ARV prices in low-and middle-income countries. This paper focuses on three price-reduction strategies: procurement arrangements designed to increase purchase volumes, third-party price negotiation for generic ARVs and differential pricing for branded ARVs.
The first strategy, procurement arrangements to increase purchase volumes, often involves pooled procurement schemes that group multiple purchasers into a single purchasing unit in the hope that economies of scale will lead to lower prices. A pooled procurement mechanism is currently being developed at the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM).
2,3
The second large-scale strategy involves third-party consultation and price negotiation with generic ARV suppliers, a practice introduced by the Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) in 2003. 4 In practice, CHAI attempts to make ARVs more affordable by negotiating price ceilings that reflect suppliers' costs plus reasonable and sustainable profit margins. 4 Moreover, CHAI furthers this strategy by providing direct technical assistance to some suppliers to help lower their production costs. 4 The resulting ceiling prices are made available to all members of the CHAI procurement consortium. 4 Countries that wish to become part of the consortium sign a memorandum of understanding with CHAI and manufacturers are required to offer ARVs to these countries at prices equal to or less than CHAI-negotiated ceiling prices.
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The third strategy involves differential pricing, sometimes referred to as price discrimination or tiered pricing. In 2000, the Accelerating Access Initiative, a 
Methods

Data sources
We used data on ARV procurement transactions from the GFATM Purchase price report and the WHO Global Price Reporting Mechanism (GPRM) for the period between July 2002 and October 2007. 6, 7 The GFATM posts details of ARV procurements reported by their international aid recipients on the web-based Purchase price report. 6 In addition, procurement data from the GFATM as well as procurement data provided by WHO country offices, international organizations, procurement agencies and others are posted by WHO on the web-based GPRM, which serves as the global repository for data on ARV procurement. 7, 12 As shown in Fig. 1 , data from these two sources were combined in For the current analysis, we restricted our data set to ARV products supplied in a solid form, such as tablets, capsules and caplets. To focus on the more commonly used ARVs and to ensure reasonable sample sizes for regression models, we chose ARVs with procurement sample sizes of 100 or more (i.e. the ARV was purchased at least 100 times 
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The public data sources provided basic transaction information; however, to examine determinants of price, we created additional independent variables, namely, differential price-eligibility, CHAI-eligibility, volume and quality. Whether or not a branded ARV purchase was eligible for differential pricing was determined using 14 Whether or not a generic ARV purchase was classified as a CHAI or a non-CHAI purchase was determined from information provided by CHAI on when countries joined the consortium and from CHAI ARV price lists, which indicated the manufacturers and products subject to agreements over the previous 5 years. 15 Relevant ARV purchases were considered eligible for CHAI or differential pricing 6 months after the announcement of new prices offered via CHAI or differential-pricing schemes. This was done to account for the likely scenario that a country may have been locked into a previously negotiated price for an annual procurement cycle and may, therefore, have been unable to access newly announced Table 1 .
Analytic approach to determinants of price
We used existing and newly created variables to examine determinants of the price of ARVs. We devised separate regression models for each of the 24 ARV dosage forms by using generalized estimating equation linear regression to take account of the correlated nature of the data. Price, our dependent variable, was non-normally distributed; therefore, we adopted the natural log of the price per tablet or capsule as our outcome measure.
Data were clustered by country and year of purchase to take into account potential correlations in price within these variables. Candidate predictor variables were: the for paediatric ARVs, we used doses for children weighing 10 kg, as recommended by WHO.
20-22
Results
Effect of purchase volume on ARV price
We detected no statistically significant association between purchase volume and price at the country level for 19 of the 24 (79%) dosage forms after adjusting for other variables in the regression model (Table 2 ). For two of the five dosage forms for which there was a significant association between volume and price, the prices for high-volume purchases were 7% and 21% less, respectively, than for low-volume purchases. For two other dosage forms, the prices for high-volume purchases were less than for both medium-and low-volume purchases, with differences being 4% and 5% less, respectively, for one ARV and 11% and 16% less, respectively, for the other. The other dosage form was 6% less expensive for high-volume purchases than for medium-volume purchases.
Generic ARV prices for CHAI and non-CHAI purchases
We identified 13 generic ARV products for which CHAI had negotiated price ceilings with manufacturers on behalf of CHAI country consortium members. We compared the actual prices paid for generic ARVs by CHAI and non-CHAI countries and found that the price of 9 of 13 (69%) dosage forms was significantly lower for CHAI purchases than non-CHAI purchases (Table 3 , columns A, B and C). Overall, CHAI prices were less than non-CHAI prices by 6-36% (Table 3 , column C).
Generic and differentially priced branded ARV prices
Of the 24 (79%) solid ARV dosage forms analysed, 19 were available to some countries through differential-pricing schemes provided by the brand-name manufacturer ( (Table 3 , column E). For 15 of these 18 (83%) dosage forms, purchases made under differential-pricing schemes were significantly more expensive than non-CHAI generic purchases, with price differences ranging from 23-498% (Table 3 , column E). For two of the 18 (11%) ARV dosage forms, prices for differentially priced branded ARVs were 63% and 73% lower, respectively, than prices for non-CHAI generic ARVs. The price difference between the differentially priced branded product and the non-CHAI generic version was significant for all 18 ARV dosage forms, apart from ritonavir 100 mg.
Discussion
We combined data from medicine procurement databases made public by the GFATM and WHO with information from other sources to evaluate price-reduction strategies for
ARVs for the first time and found some surprising results. The most counterintuitive finding is the absence of an association between purchase volume and price at the country level for 19 of the 24 ARV dosage forms (see Table 2 ). Although conventional business practice suggests that making a large-volume purchase at the country level will result in a discounted price, this appears not to be the case for these medicines.
The GFATM has recommended the facilitation of voluntary pooled procurement as a means of increasing procurement efficiency. 2,3 Pooled procurement of ARVs will result in much larger purchase volumes than those explored in our study, but it remains difficult to quantify exactly how much money could be saved by pooling purchase orders.
Any estimate of potential savings resulting from pooled procurement must be balanced against the programmatic costs of establishing and managing the procurement systems required. While some surveys and desk reviews have described potential pooled procurement mechanisms in developing countries, 23,24 insufficient empirical research has been carried out to validate pooled procurement and identify the conditions under which it can operate most efficiently. Pooled procurement may certainly offer other potential supply chain efficiencies beyond increased purchase volumes, but it should be carefully monitored to ensure such efficiencies are achieved.
While interventions for improving procurement efficiency are certainly desirable, they should be designed to develop and increase the technical capability for managing Publication: Bulletin of the World Health Organization; Type: Research Article DOI: 10.2471/BLT.08.058925 these procurement systems in the countries concerned. New procurement arrangements, whereby donors and international organizations act on behalf of countries for selected diseases, may fail to help strengthen those countries' health systems. Lastly, pooled purchase arrangements will reduce the number of purchasers and could, therefore, result in a dramatic restructuring of the current global ARV market. Econometric modelling should be used to predict the potential impact of pooled procurement on the global ARV market and the findings should be used to inform the design of these schemes.
Third-party price negotiation by CHAI shows promise. Overall, the price of generic ARVs was less for CHAI purchases than for non-CHAI purchases. However, price differences between CHAI and non-CHAI purchases varied widely across ARVs.
While price differences were as high as 27-36% for some ARVs, for others they were less than 10%. The most dramatic price differences between CHAI and non-CHAI generic ARVs were typically observed in the 1 to 2 years immediately following negotiations with suppliers. We recommend, therefore, that additional time-series research be carried out to explore the reasons why these price differences diminish over time and their potential impact on the overall ARV market.
Traditional approaches using differential-pricing schemes have not decreased the prices of branded ARVs to levels that can make these drugs compete with generic ARVs in most scenarios, which suggests that differential pricing alone is insufficient for achieving and sustaining universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment. In this study, nearly all the branded ARVs offered under differential pricing schemes were more expensive than the equivalent generics. There were a few exceptions where generic competition was While this research has provided some important findings, our analysis has limitations. Because we were dealing with pre-existing data, we used a standard method to remove outliers that may have come from erroneous reports. However, we repeated our analysis with the outliers included and the results did not differ from those presented in this paper. We also repeated our regression analyses using volume fourths instead of volume thirds and found the same results. Our study examined price-volume relationships at the level of individual purchases and did not consider total volume-price relationships at the level of tender arrangements, as these data were unavailable. Indeed, countries usually tender once or twice a year for larger volumes that are delivered in the multiple smaller purchase volumes reported in the databases. Still, larger tenders are likely to involve larger individual purchase volumes, so an analysis at the tender level would probably reveal similar results. It is notable that an association between volume and price was found for 5 of the 24 ARV dosage forms. This suggests that more work is needed to better understand the exceptional conditions under which the volume purchased at the country level may determine the ARV price.
Our regression models contained many candidate variables thought to be associated with price; however, we lacked access to information on additional factors that may have an influence, such as the timeliness of payment, the lead time between when an ARV is ordered and when it is needed, the presence or absence of drug registration, and intellectual property regulation. While many pricing studies must consider purchase incentives such as bundling, rebates and discounts, we doubt that such purchase arrangements played a major role in our study of donor-funded national ARV procurements. Lastly, our study focused on ARV prices only; other programmatic costs associated with the treatment of HIV/AIDS were not considered.
The quality of medicines on the market varies within and between low-resource countries, which means that previous price research compared medicines of unequal 
